By BG (Ret.) William King
Weapon of Mass Destruction (WMD) National Security threats and the consequences posed by nuclear or radiological events remain as real today as at any time since the advent of nuclear weapons. For that reason, we have started a series of fora to address the most challenging threats and concerns. The employment of a strategic or non-strategic nuclear weapon would have devasting effects that include blast, thermal, electromagnetic pulse, and radiological fallout, writes BG (Ret.) William King.
We have seen that radiological contamination can also result from natural disasters that damage nuclear power plants, such as at the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant following the 2011 earthquake and tsunami in Japan. Although not caused by a natural disaster but instead by human error, the Chernobyl nuclear disaster in 1986 in the former Soviet Union left a toxic legacy that will persist for thousands of years.
While blast and thermal effects are immediate challenges, perhaps the greatest military and civil operational challenges of a radiological or nuclear event are identifying radiological hazards, monitoring potential exposure, and diagnosing and treating radiation injuries and exposures. As radiation exposure comes in many forms – including external and internal exposure to radioactive isotopes either deposited on the skin or through inhalation or ingestion, or from external exposure to ionizing radiation energy alone – one of the most essential elements of mass casualty management is diagnosis and triage of radiation injury.
As radiation is essentially invisible to the naked eye, a large population of “worried well” are expected to overwhelm existing medical resources. These “worried well” are people in the affected population who do not have physical injuries but are concerned to the point of incapacitation about whether they have received radiation exposure. There is much to be done to improve radiological defense capabilities and these efforts require collaborative initiatives between industry and government. Defining requirements provides the direction for capability improvement, but consistent centralized management and resourcing is critical to delivering solutions and sustaining the unique elements of the industrial base associated with this mission area. Capabilities and solutions must include medical and non-medical aspects and ultimately lead to more timely decisions to protect personnel and accomplish the mission.
Since the 9/11 terrorist attacks on the USA, comprehensive emergency planning and preparedness guidelines for the management of a radiological or nuclear event in the U.S. have been developed at the federal level. Federal guidelines for emergency response have been developed, including the “Planning Guidance for Response to a Nuclear Detonation”, “Key Response Planning Factors for the Aftermath of Nuclear Terrorism”, the Department of Homeland Security’s “Nuclear/Radiological Incident Annex to the Response and Recovery Federal Interagency Operational Plans”, and “Radiological Dispersal Device Response Guidance: Planning for the First 100 Minutes”. There are also web-based resources now available from the Center for Disease Control and Prevention and the Radiation Emergency Medical Management, providing “just in time” information for managing of radiation injuries.
These efforts include protective action recommendations, proposals for systems for mass casualty management and triage, development and licensure of new medical countermeasures, and comprehensive playbooks to guide emergency response. Military and civil defense capabilities responsible for responding to radiological and nuclear threats have greatly advanced at the federal, state, and local levels over the last several decades, as demonstrated via post Nunn-Lugar-Domenici Act Domestic Preparedness (NDIA) Program training, exercises, and focused assessments.
However, these advancements have not kept pace with the evolving threat and operational environments. Effective response requires enhanced detection, identification, and protection technologies and dramatically improved medical countermeasures. Equally important are repetitive training, education, and exercises to ensure that local, state, and federal organizations have the capabilities and proficiency to mitigate the effects of a radiological or nuclear incident.
To promote increased awareness about the radiological and nuclear capabilities required for the joint force to effectively operate against this threat and stimulate collaboration across government and industry to deliver improved capabilities, NDIA’s CBRN Division proudly sponsored a Radiological and Nuclear passive defense workshop on March 24, 2021, and again on April 10, 2024. The workshop highlighted that radiological and nuclear passive defense technologies are required to both maintain a competitive security and defensive advantage in the current and anticipated global competitive environment and to effectively respond to the accidental release of radiological material such as was seen during the response to the nuclear accident at Fukushima Daiichi.
These same capabilities would be used to respond to a nuclear event in the U.S. or abroad, and most of our allies and partners are critically relying on the U.S. to provide these essential capabilities. However, contrary to many assumptions, not many new technologies exist to improve the joint warfighter’s ability to survive and operate in a radiologically contaminated environment. More work is critically needed to improve and enhance existing legacy capabilities.
Several themes emerged from the workshop and were present throughout. The first was the need to modernize and improve upon existing capabilities within the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD). Capability improvements depend on our ability to capture and validate requirements that drive change. These requirements are pivotal in guiding the identification of new technologies or focusing engineering enhancements in proven technologies to improve radiological detection, monitoring, and identification. An added benefit of well-defined requirements is that they facilitate dialogue between DoD developers, users, and industry to ensure timely, cost-effective, and sustainable modernization of radiological defense capabilities. Simulating realistic and demanding radiological effects in training events increases organizational readiness and provides an excellent source of information to define new requirements to improve capabilities.
Another key theme was the value of centralized advocacy and resourcing to ensure compatibility across the joint force where missions are similar, as is the case with chemical, biological, and radiological events. Without a consistent advocate, funding profiles fluctuate and increase the time and cost to deliver new solutions to warfighters, disincentivizing industry to invest in this area and leading to a weak industrial base and supply chain. Additionally, centralization facilitates partnerships with other federal agencies that increase compatibility, reduce costs, and foster collaboration to find the best solutions. Even civilian nuclear safety operations provide opportunities for collaboration.
The workshop also highlighted that advances in communications and decision support technologies can provide a great opportunity to increase the understanding of a radiological hazard sooner. Faster and more effective decision-making could prevent loss of life or equipment, and even avoid long-term health effects. Advanced technologies such as data analytics and cloud-based computation can be leveraged to improve integrated early warning and enhanced decision-making for chemical and biological threats and should also be required to account for radiological effects.
The workshop did not focus on radiological health effects, but the discussions did highlight that medical countermeasures are a critical component of radiological and nuclear defensive capabilities since physical protection options are limited. It also highlighted that there are valuable lessons learned from the occupational and public health communities and the U.S. COVID mitigation response that can be applied to improve our radiological and nuclear defense capabilities to protect and treat individuals.
In summary, there is much left to be done to improve radiological defense capabilities and these efforts require a collaborative effort between industry and government. Defining requirements provides the direction for where capabilities can be improved, but consistent centralized management and resourcing is critical to delivering solutions and sustaining the unique elements of the industrial base associated with this mission area. Capabilities and solutions must include medical and non-medical aspects and ultimately lead to more timely decisions to protect personnel and accomplish the mission.
BG (Ret.) William King has served in a wide variety of command, leadership, and staff positions across numerous levels of the U.S. Army, Joint Task Forces, Regional Commands, and most recently as the Commanding General of 20th CBRNE Command before retiring on July 19, 2017, with 30+ years of active-duty U.S. Army service. Today he is a Principal/Director at Booz Allen Hamilton, responsible for developing the market for Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction.