by Mr. Stijn Kuipers, Dutch Ministry of Economics and Climate Policy, Netherlands
COVID-19 has reinvigorated concerns, if not panic, about the dangers of synthetic bioweapons. Yes, COVID-19 may not have been created in a lab, but it was able to kill approximately 6,5 million people and paralyze societies for up to 2 years (and is still going strong in some places). Just imagine what a pathogen engineered for such a task could do. Academic journals and famous media outlets such as the Economist have not scrimped on spelling out the disaster scenarios.
This article is not aimed at dispelling all concerns about synthetic bioweapons; they are indeed dangerous. It does try to dispel the hype. The narrative about the “synthetic revolution” in bioengineering of the last 2 decades has tended to diminish technical and socio-political factors which limit the potential of synthetic bioweapons to transform public health safety or “the future of warfare” for the worse. In contrast, the overtly alarmist tone in the debate carries potentially detrimental implications for policy making and defence planning if it leads to over-regulation of labs, academic research and/or misguided resource allocation.
All concerns revolve around 1 simple assertion: the rapid developments in synthetic biology over the last 2 decades have made it much easier for everyone to alter pathogens, bringing bioweapons within reach of terrorist groups and (rogue) nations as a “poor man’s atomic bomb”. There are however 2 serious reasons to doubt this scenario.
Firstly, in contrast to the “now anyone can hack DNA”-newspaper articles, synthetic biology is (still) incredibly difficult, even for experts. Top-notch labs struggle with many of the stages required to achieve desired functions in live organisms, let alone attempts to build biosynthetic entities from scratch. The most heard sentence in a microbiology lab is “my cells have died”. And when things go right, there are still many challenges to be overcome. For example, attempts to improve the characteristics of agents on their own often lead to the diminishment of other desirable characteristics, because a single gene can affect multiple (and on the surface unrelated) traits. This is known as pleiotropy and presents both a measure of uncertainty and the necessity of trade-off in pathogen manipulation.
Synbio has not “solved” such challenges, as it also heavily relies on the ability to predict the biological function of genes from nucleic acid or protein structures. It has therefore remained very difficult to predict how specific genes, especially foreign strands inserted into a genome, will interact with other genes and the organism as a whole by primarily looking at the structure of the genes in question. When entities have less resemblance to natural organisms, such as when they would be created “from scratch”, the effects can be even harder to predict. These inherent challenges even leave out recent complications within synbio, such as certain techniques deleting too large strands and unintentionally shuffling genes.
This bodes ill for even experienced amateurs who have a level of microbiological training. While they commonly work with well-known biological material, these living organisms are often non-responsive to manipulation attempts, mutate or die, as hobbyists have to work without the specialist expertise, experience and equipment available in institutionalized laboratories. The first bump in the use of do-it-yourself DNA kits is often already encountered when pipetting, which turns out to require a significant level of experience and tacit knowledge. Just as the fact that the procedure on how to build a plane is readily available on the internet does not mean that any member of the general public can build a plane, the availability of the chemical and biological make-up of existing viruses and bacteria online does not mean that many people can use this information to “hack DNA”, let alone to build a bioweapon.
This might be made more clear by looking at the most extensive and well-documented non-state bioweapon programmes as carried out by the Aum Shinrikyo cult, responsible for the Tokyo Subway Sarin Attacks in 1995. The group operated under near-ideal conditions. It was notably well-resourced; both its biological and chemical weapon programmes were led by highly educated members and its activities went virtually undetected by Japanese law enforcement. Yet, the group failed in almost every attempt to produce a truly effective bio-agent. While they focused on ‘correct’, highly toxic pathogens (anthrax and botulinum), the production process continuously ran into technical mishaps. The strains used were not capable of producing sufficient concentrations of toxin, while the fermenters used in the production process weren’t sterile, leading to cross-contamination and reduced pathogen effectiveness. Attempts to genetically engineer a benign strain of anthrax to produce a virulent one also failed, although it was theoretically possible. And the sarin released in the subway system was impure, limiting casualties. While this might sound clumsy, it is worth emphasising that all Shinrikyo’s leading figures in the weapon programme had graduated in fields like viral medicine and agricultural engineering. As such, the Shinrikyo case re-emphasises the importance of professional labs and extensive hands-on experience for the effective weaponization of microorganisms, clearly showing that mere knowledge of pathogens is not enough. Because synthetic biology is so complicated, it does little to alter this given fact.
Secondly, there are important socio-political considerations to re-evaluate the danger of bioweapons. Even if an expert group would be able to create a dangerous pathogen, the human genome is too homogenous to fully shield “Caucasians” or “Asians” from its effects, let alone specific nationalities and in-groups, which mean little to a virus. This means that it is almost impossible to avoid a pathogen from wreaking havoc within a nation’s or non-state actor’s (ethnic) in-group, presenting both a direct danger and a clear way to lose support for your agenda. Isolated or small-scale use, such as anthrax, would be a serious possibility, but in these cases a knife attack or a bomb could be used to the same, and more reliable, effect (so that the wind does not dissolve your pathogen outdoors).
Within the international sphere, the use of bioweapons for deterrence is also limited. Deterrence is based on the capability of an actor to assure an adversary that an unwanted action on their part will impose more costs than benefits. This makes it necessary for any strategic weapon to be able to reliably impose such unacceptable costs, even or especially if the enemy would strike first. Nuclear weapons have been the primary deterrent since WO II due to their massive and immediate destructive capacities, against which there is basically no possible defence. This is one of the biggest differences between nuclear and biological weapons, as defence against bioweapons is a possibility. Especially considering the limits on novel pathogen creation, masks, filters, and vaccines can be used to protect soldiers and civilians. Bioweapons simply do not promise (mutually) assured destruction.
Conclusion
The potential impact of synthetic bioweapons is much more limited than the current debate, both academic and popular, would suggest. Yes, they are dangerous and yes, we need to make preparations. But it is time to tune down the talk about “new killer pathogens”, “biochemical Armageddon” and “the next engineered COVID”. Synbio weapons are comparable to chemical weapons and guns; we need to be prepared, but not consistently alarmed.
Author: Bio
Stijn Kuipers has studied the security implications of synthetic bioweapons at the Department of War Studies, King’s College London. He holds degrees from Radboud University Nijmegen, Leiden University, King’s College and the University of Cambridge, and currently works within the Dutch Ministry of Economics and Climate Policy on industrial strategy, business & human rights and “Vision 2050”, a project to visualise goals and ideals for the Dutch economy and society in 2050.
