By Athula Daulagala
Athula Daulagala discusses the work of the Sri Lanka Police and their Special Task Force in protecting the country from radiological threats.
Sri Lanka Police was established on September 3, 1886, and has approximately 85,000 employees. Remaining committed and confident to upholding and enforcing the law, preserving public order, and preventing crime and terrorism with prejudice to none and equity to all, Sri Lanka Police’s task is to protect the 22 million inhabitants of the country against a multitude of threats.
The Special Task Force (STF) of the Sri Lanka Police was founded on March 1, 1983, and has approximately 8,000 employees. It is a professional paramilitary agency that supports maintaining law and order in the country, and it is also responsible for responding to and mitigating CBRNe incidents, including those of a radiological nature.
Sri Lanka has been fortunate in not facing any significant CBRN threats to date. However, authorities remain vigilant, especially after the 2019 Easter Sunday attacks, where precursor chemicals were used by radicalized extremists. This tragic event, which targeted churches and hotels, resulted in 269 deaths, including 45 foreign nationals, and over 500 injuries. Although the responsible group has not posed a threat since, the incident underscores the ongoing need for vigilance.
Radiological Terrorism Risks
There are at present three ways in which terrorists may unleash a radiological terrorist attack. These are improvised nuclear devices creating a massive explosive force and radiation, radiological dispersal devices – or commonly known as dirty bombs – or radiological exposure devices intended to expose innocent people to significant doses of ionizing radiation without their knowledge. These can be hidden in a public place, for example.
CBRNe weapons might not only be of interest to those seeking to inflict a maximum amount of damage. They may also be seen as advantageous by those who seek to sow fear and anxiety in societies. The general belief is that this is more likely to be achieved using CBRN weapons than through conventional weapons.
Since there are readily available, easier means for carrying out terrorist attacks – such as mass shootings or marauding vehicle attacks – it is important to consider why terrorists may decide to seek and use CBRN materials.
Firstly, the use of CBRN materials in terrorist attacks remains fairly rare, although there are some notable exceptions. In 1994, residents of Matsumoto, Japan, began presenting with symptoms of nerve gas exposure. There were seven deaths and some 500 injuries. This was a test run for a second attack in 1995 in a Tokyo subway, in which 12 people died and thousands sought medical attention. The attacks came from the apocalyptic Aum Shinrikyo cult that was trying to develop biological weapons. In the recent past, we have also seen CBRN weapons used in assassination attempts. These have included choking agents such as chlorine and cyanide, blister agents such as mustard gas, nerve agents such as sarin and VX, and incapacitating agents such as BZ.
As was the case with Aum Shinrikyo, using CBRN weapons today may potentially raise the international profile of the terrorist organization and their ideology in both traditional and social media. Secondly, the potential to inflict mass casualties and significant economic damage could cripple the targeted nation. A successful CBRN terrorist attack would also be a strong symbolic demonstration of the power of the terrorist group.
Some observers believe that unmanned aerial vehicles may have a significant impact on the capabilities of non-state actors, including those considering the use of CBRN materials for a terrorist attack. Furthermore, drone swarms could be used by non-state actors to conduct CBRN attacks, including on critical infrastructure. Meanwhile, the Dark Web enables terrorists to communicate anonymously and securely over the internet, giving significant opportunities for information-sharing relating to illegal activities, including the production or acquisition of CBRN weapons, and the planning of future terrorist attacks.
CBRN Material Monitoring
State agencies’ own possession of CBRN materials must be monitored. The security of high-risk CBRN materials and facilities, the security of transport systems, the security and efficacy of information exchange and communication, and whether staff live and work in a 24/7 security culture, must all be included in robust risk assessments. As mentioned earlier, concerns about the theft of radioactive materials that could then be associated with acts of terrorism globally must also be considered.
CBRN threats will present challenges to law enforcement and allied agencies, with multiple actors and scenarios to consider. These threats are infused by rapid technological change and involve threats ranging from natural sources through accidental releases and negligence in the manufacturing and use of CBRN materials to use by criminals, terrorists, or even state actors. In 2020, a massive blast occurred in Beirut when ammonium nitrate exploded killing 220 people, although the reason was attributed to fire.
The threat of terrorists using chemicals as weapons is a significant global challenge. The Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) Member States have recognized the threat posed to the Chemical Weapons Convention by non-state actors, and have underlined that the effective implementation of all provisions of the Chemical Weapons Convention is in itself a contribution to global counter-terrorism efforts. The global norm against chemical weapons is not only a legal agreement, but also a moral declaration about the dignity of humanity.
Sri Lanka’s Response to Radiological Incidents
Common radioactive materials include cobalt-60, cesium-137, and strontium-90. These sources and others like themhave many beneficial applications, ranging from power generation to use in medicine, industry, and agriculture. Activities such as the medical uses of radiation, the operation of nuclear installations, the production, transport and the use of radioactive material, and the management of radioactive waste must therefore be subject to safety standards.
Indeed, there are 14 medical, research, and industrial sites in Sri Lanka that deal with radioactive material, and their presence in hospitals and facilities represents a vulnerability. Some radioactive material storage locations in Sri Lanka include the Tellippalai Cancer Hospital, Kandy General Hospital, Gannoruwa Agricultural Research Institute, and Orugodawatta AEB Waste Storage.
Therefore, the National Radiological Theft Response Code stipulates that the Sri Lanka Atomic Energy Regulatory Council take nationwide leadership for coordinating and responding to incidents of theft of radiological sources. Working in partnership with the Council, the Sri Lanka Police and STF are the other lead organizations charged with responding to cases of theft or attempted theft of radioactive material, and the Council should immediately coordinate with the Sri Lanka Police and STF to organize responses to incidents. Should any radioactive sources be stolen or smuggled, the STF will respond swiftly and take action to control the situation, engage when required, recapture the stolen radioactive material, and arrest the suspected persons.
Furthermore, with the guidance and collaboration of the U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Systems Administration, Pacific Northwest Laboratory, Office of Radiological Security, Global Materials Security, and the Sri Lanka Atomic Energy Regulatory Council, the STF also established the nation’s first central monitoring station at Katukurunda from where 14 sites that deal with radioactive material are monitored 24/7.
Training Programs and Capacity Development
The Special Task Force training academy analyzes, designs, develops, and implements training programs to constantly evaluate and upgrade the knowledge and skills of nationwide officers currently engaged with securing radioactive materials. They boast classrooms, medical facilities, and specialized vehicles, as well as the central monitoring facility at Katukurunda.
The training academy offers five training courses on different aspects of handling radioactive materials and dealing with incidents involving radioactive materials. These courses include a basic awareness course on securing radioactive material, alarm monitoring, incident response team training, emergency call center training for police officers, and radioactive material transportation.
Among other things, each training program includes an introduction to the Sri Lanka Atomic Energy Act, radiation detection tools, and the development of a response plan for the security and transport of radiological materials. Courses also include training on physical protection systems and table-top exercises.
Especially when it comes to transporting radioactive and fissile materials, other dangerous properties of the contents of the package – such as explosiveness, flammability, chemical toxicity, and corrosiveness – should be taken into account in the packing, storage, and transport in order to be in compliance with the relevant regulations. It is best to transport such chemical/radioactive goods under armed police or military escort as such convoys have been attacked in the past.
Between 2019 and 2024, teams from the Special Task Force and Sri Lanka Navy have taken part in seven full and refresher training courses on CBRNe and radiation protection and transportation, with between 20 and 50 participants each time.
15 Years of Improved Security Measures
As late as 2009, Sri Lanka had no basic security safeguards concerning radiological materials. However, the last 15 years have seen the country embark on a continuous mission to improve its preparedness and response, culminating with the continuous operation of the central monitoring system in 2020.
Milestones since 2009 include the establishment of an integrated security platform in 2013, a revised Atomic Energy Act in 2014, a security plan and response training in 2016, comprehensive CBRNe training in 2017, and central monitoring station training programs in 2019.
Today, Katukurunda’s central monitoring station offers CCTV real-time visuals and an alarm system for detection, as well as information sharing capabilities with site owners and the nearest police and STF bases. On-site guards and hotlines to the Sri Lanka Police and special response teams guarantee rapid responses in the event of radiological emergencies.
Within Sri Lanka, the STF remains alert and trained to mitigate any future CBRN threat, working alongside other armed forces and national agencies.
Athula Daulagala is a Senior Superintendent in the Special Task Force, a paramilitary arm of the Sri Lanka Police. He counts over 39 years of policing experience specifically in counter-terrorism. For the majority of this time, he worked in explosive engineering, explosive ordinance disposal, improvised explosive device management, bombing scenes management and forensic investigation. He served as the Training Director of the Special Task Force Academy. He was a key member in setting up the pioneer CBRNe team in the Sri Lanka Police, and designed, developed, and oversaw CBRNe-related training courses for defense servicers, police, and private sector. He retired from active service at the age of 60 in July 2023, and now works in private sector health and safety in the security industry and safe transport of hazardous materials in Sri Lanka. He exchanges his knowledge and experiences as a subject matter expert through various international and national organizations.
