SynBio: The Threat of Designer Pathogens
NCT Virtual Hub – August “SynBio: the Threat of Designer Pathogens” took place on Tuesday, 3 August 2021, highlighting the importance of addressing the threats stemming from synthetic biology, such as designer pathogens, to global security.
The virtual conference, attended by participants from 21 countries, opened with remarks from Ms. Anna Paternnosto, Vice-President of CBRNe society, and BG (Ret.) William King, Former Commander of the US Army 20th CBRNE Command, who co-chaired the event. The first and second panels were composed of experts in key roles in their organizations which analyze, enforce, and respond to issues and challenges in the field of SynBio. In our first panel four speakers took the floor: Dr. Diane DiEuliis Ph.D, Senior Research fellow at National Defense University; Dr. Ada Bacetty, Department Chief for the Biological Threat Reduction Program of DoD’s Cooperative Threat Reduction program at the DTRA; Dr. Margaret E. Kosal, Associate Professor at Georgia Institute of Technology; and Dr. James Giordano, Professor in the Departments of Neurology and Biochemistry, Georgetown University.
The panelists addressed various questions regarding security challenges stemming from synthetic biology, mainly in the areas of governance, research and development, and preparedness. Addressing the first question of our session regarding the main threats coming from SynBio and how to deal with them, Dr. DiEuliis mentioned that a complete reconstruction of viruses from scratch is possible, making effective use of the biological tools in order to design high value chemicals as well. Even if the latter can have positive effects for society, in the meantime it is imperative that a serious discussion about bio-security must take place. Dr. Bacetty stressed the importance of the international partnership on this matter, especially that of the global scientific community. All organizations need to cooperate with each other as accountability and oversight become more complex. This way, one can find a lot of means to deal with the emerging issue of terrorist actors accessing pathogens as well.
Dr. Kosal stressed that Syn-Bio is not only a single thing as it is often presented as it has become “a catch-all phrase.” A new framework must be established taking into account the difference of threats under this category, which are not equal. In the prospect that Syn-Bio may challenge the dominance of nuclear weapons regarding strategic stability, Dr. Kosal agreed that this could complicate geopolitics and it is a potential threat to consider in the future. Continuing with Dr. Giordano, he mentioned the importance of following a holistic approach towards the issue, including the research community and enterprises. A cooperative and competitive threat reduction approach is the main thing to target at, engaging in the meantime the social sciences as well. As he emphasized, a multi-national discourse is important in order a synthetic approach to come out of this.
In the questions to follow, our speakers shared their expertise on the topics of practical approaches to the issue and how to prevent malicious use of this technology. According to Dr. DiEuliis the technology is rapidly advancing, making it difficult to follow. There are of course a lot of challenges to deal with such as the issue of attribution at the international stage, the role of OPCW and also lessons learned from the current pandemic. Additionally, Dr. Kosal stressed the importance of successful intelligence. As new emerging technologies become available, their malicious use also becomes much more difficult to control. The current arms control regimes are only a tool but not the final solution to every problem. Dr. Giordano also stressed out the importance of international surveillance, partnership and restoring trust in the level of communications. At the same time, understanding both the dynamics with your competitors and the capabilities of allies is crucial. Lastly, Dr. Bacetty highlighted the importance of a robust definition of bio-weapons and examining dual use capabilities. Specific and reliable risk vulnerability assessments can also be used in this regard.
The second panel kicked off with discussions welcoming Dr. Christopher Houchens, Director of the Division of CBRN Medical Countermeasures, BARDA, Dr. Christian Hassell, Acting Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary, DHS, Prof. Jean-Claude Manuguerra, Head of Structure Environment and Infectious risks, Institut Pasteur, France, and Dr. Gregory Koblentz, Biodefence expert, George Mason University. The discussion started as the panelists were asked to reflect on the aspects of the democratization of synthetic biology technologies. From the European perspective, Prof. Manuguerra noted that the integration of SynBio as a dual use technology has direct effects on biosafety and biosecurity. Prof. Manuguerra stressed that in France, as well as in the EU, threats to biosafety and biosecurity are in fact a source of concern due to the relatively low requirement in skills and financial resources. On the same note, Dr. Koblentz highlighted that in his view, the DIY community poses less of a threat, but rather, the increasing investments of the private sector in advanced synthetic biology technologies increases the potential of dual research to occur. Nonetheless, Dr. Hassell stressed that these technologies can and should be explored and developed while engaging with the DIY community with the aim of identifying suspicious activities and further developing ideas. Complementary to Dr. Hassell, Dr. Houchens concluded that despite the concerns made regarding the private industry’s use of such advanced technologies, there is a strong connection and reliance between the government and industry as a source that drives innovation. According to Dr. Houchens, crowd sourcing to a network of innovators can assist governmental agencies to complete their mission while responding to events such as infectious diseases.
The discussion then revolved around the topic of the intersection between public health security and synthetic biology as an enabling technology. According to Dr. Koblentz, progress has been made in the field, however, some gaps remain as exposed by the ongoing COVID-19. In order to address those gaps, Dr. Hassell and Dr. Koblentz stressed that focusing on inter-agency and cross-sectoral cooperation is necessary, while setting priorities and identifying threats are of importance. From Prof. Manuguerra’s view, one measure through which biological/pandemic threats can be identified and reduced is by ensuring that appropriate systems are in place, and that it is the ethical duty of institutions that such systems are placed in the right hands (i.e. operated by familiar institutions).
We would like to sincerely thank all our delegates and speakers as well as our sponsors: ThermoFisher, Bruker, Eurosatory.
