Forecasting Terrorism with CBRN Weapons

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By Dr. Joshua Sinai

Dr. Joshua Sinai of Capitol Technology University analyzes six variables that determine whether a non-state actor may resort to CBRN weapons in terrorist attacks.

CBRN weapons and devices are considered the most lethal category of “unconven­tional” warfare. It is known that conventional military forces possess the capability and weapons to conduct such warfare, but it is less known whether terrorist groups and lone actors have the technological capability and weapons to launch such attacks. 

In the past, several terrorist groups, including hybrid terrorist and guerrilla organizations, and lone actor terrorists, have employed some of these weapons of mass destruction in their warfare. While no major CBRN attacks by terrorist groups and lone actors have occurred since the early 2000s – the 2001 anthrax letters attacks in the U.S. – being one of them, several attacks by state actors have employed chemical agents to kill their intended targets. 

In this next phase of asymmetrical warfare, in which less powerful terrorist adversaries wage attacks against their more powerful state targets, terrorist operatives will likely exploit the latest technological advances in weapons of mass destruction, with artificial intelligence being one of them. In the meantime, much of their CBRN weaponry is likely to be relatively crude in form since terrorists do not possess the technological capability of nation-states, although some governments might assist their terrorist proxies to this end. 

Conventional warfare is likely to remain the most globally pervasive form of warfare in terrorists’ targeting of their adversaries. Especially following the devastating catastrophic impact of the naturally caused COVID-19 pandemic, nevertheless, it is likely that some terrorist adversaries, whether as groups or lone actors, will attempt to resort to CBRN warfare to wreck lethal vengeance against their adversaries.

Because the transition from conventional to un­conventional terrorist warfare is still in its nascent stages, a comprehensive threat assessment is required to forecast whether a terrorist group or a lone actor is likely to embark on conventional or CBRN warfare. In assessing the likelihood of CBRN terrorist warfare, six variables need to be examined. These variables are affected by several internal and external hurdles that need to be overcome for a group or lone actor to mount a successful CBRN ter­rorist operation against its adversary.

Cost

First, how much would it cost a ter­rorist group to acquire the capability to employ CBRN weapons and devices? In general, there are significant costs in acquiring, weaponizing, stock­piling, and deploying CBRN weapons of varying levels of sophistication and lethality, unless a group succeeds in obtain­ing such a device from a state sponsor or in stealing or hijacking such a device. 

As a result, fi­nancial considerations play a role in deciding whether a group will choose single or multiple CBRN weapons, what types of dispersal systems they will use, and whether these weapons will be in­digenously developed, provided by a state sponsor, or obtained from an external source, whether legally or through smuggling, hijacking, or theft.

CBRN weapons for use in terrorist attacks vary greatly in their cost. For example, acquiring or pro­ducing and developing an operational capability to deploy chemical or biological weapons and devices involves relatively small financial resources and is within the means of many terrorist groups. Far more significant financial resources, which only a few groups possess, are necessary to acquire tactical nuclear weapons, such as suitcase nuclear devices. Nevertheless, some terrorist groups, such as Aum Shinrikyo and al-Qaida in their heyday, or Hezbollah and the so-called Islamic State, could potentially acquire a crude nuclear weapon because of the vast financial resources accruing from their multiplicity of legitimate and criminal business enterprises, as well as Hezbollah’s sponsorship by Iran.

Motivations

The second variable concerns what a group hopes to achieve from acquiring and deploying CBRN weapons. In terms of biological weapons, a group might choose to employ agents and toxins that can cause mass destruction across a large geographical area, such as the highly contagious smallpox biological agent. Some biological attacks may not inflict massive ca­sualties but may instead cause massive economic and societal costs. To this end, the COVID-19 pandemic might serve as a template for a biological agent attack.

The anthrax letter attacks offer another possible template. Although there were few deaths as a result, the economic toll was significant, including several hundred million dollars in cleanup costs, the forced relocation of U.S. Senate offices, an overhaul of U.S. postal security, and the closure of the Brentwood postal facility. Chemical weapons such as sarin nerve gas can kill tens or hundreds of victims yet re­main contained geographically. 

The contamination effects of radiological dispersal devices are likely to far outweigh their direct physical impact in an ex­plosion. Thus, even after decontamination, people would be reluctant to return to the previously af­fected areas, property values would be de­pressed for lengthy periods if the neighborhoods were perceived as being radioactive, and local economies and livelihoods would suffer. Nuclear weapons, however crude or miniaturized, would in­flict tens of thousands of deaths and widespread ra­dioactive contamination on the affected areas.

Another important consideration for terrorists is whether the chosen CBRN weapons, especially chemical or biological, would cause immediate public health damages vs. delayed effects, short-term vs. long-term effects, mass fatalities or injuries, or contamination of areas resulting in short­ vs. long-term economic damages.

Terrorist letter with anthrax addressed to Democrat Senator Tom Daschle during the 2001 anthrax attacks. FBI.

Feasibility

Third, how technologically feasible is it for a ter­rorist group to deploy CBRN weapons and devices? In this sphere, the specialized training of members and recruitment of individuals with CBRN-related skills is one of the most crucial indicators demonstrating that a group is embarking on CBRN warfare.

Acquisition

Fourth, would such weapons and devices be in­digenously developed, acquired in the black or “grey” markets, or provided by a state sponsor? State sponsors provide terrorists with funds, arms, training, documentation, and other types of operational support, and obtaining the sponsorship of a state with CBRN resources would be a major indicator that a terrorist organization is attempting to carry out catastrophic warfare. There are a number of motivations and strategic and bureaucratic considerations involved in the relationship between terrorist groups and po­tential state sponsors regarding possible cooperation in catastrophic warfare. An important indicator for cooperation is whether a potential state sponsor is undergoing a profound crisis that would drive it to subcontract a CBRN operation to a terror­ist group.

However, obtaining the support of a state spon­sor is not automatic or inevitable. Potential state sponsors would have to weigh the costs and benefits involved in sponsoring CBRN operations by terrorist groups, including assisting in the phases of research, development, production, and operations planning. Other issues concern the con­ditions and arrangements for providing the terrorist group with CBRN weapons, devices, and delivery systems, as well as training, logistics, diplomatic cover, and deniability.

Thus, a number of cost/benefit factors are in­volved in the relations between state sponsors and surrogate terrorist groups. For both, there are ad­vantages and disadvantages. For terrorist groups, state sponsorship can provide the crucial assistance they require to launch a catastrophic attack. For example, attaining the support of a state sponsor with nuclear capability (such as Iran, Iraq, Pakistan, or North Korea) would shortcut the process of fabricating a high-grade nuclear bomb with weapons­ grade material. The latter is an undertaking that would be extremely difficult, although not impossible, for most terrorist groups to successfully com­plete without assistance. Such a nuclear weapon, however, would likely be smaller in terms of its explosive yield versus strategic nuclear weapons.

There are concerns that terrorist groups could acquire CBRN weapons through the support of a state sponsor, such as Iran. Picture from the “Sacred Defense Parade” in Tehran in 2013. Mehr News Agency.

Targets

Fifth, given the technological feasibility of a group’s employment of CBRN weapons and devices, against which human or physical targets – such as buildings and landmarks, or a critical economic sector, such as agriculture – would these weapons be used? Would they be employed indoors or outdoors, or against civilian or military targets? In the case of radiological or nuclear warfare, against which types of targets would such weapons be em­ployed? Or would conventional means be used to target nuclear power plants or facilities that store radiological devices, thereby inflicting a Chernobyl-type radiological event on the nearby population?

Ideology

Sixth, what ideological or religious motivations and strategic objectives would drive a terrorist group to employ CBRN weapons, especially given the risk that the use of unconventional weapons could generate an especially massive response from a targeted state? A group that demonstrates a willingness to take high risks in its warfare might be attracted to these types of attacks. Organizations intent on com­pletely destroying a government might also consider a mass casualty event as something that would fur­ther their cause. 

Religiously fundamentalist groups or lone actors are the most likely candidates to carry out CBRN terrorism because of their apocalyptic beliefs that they are engaged in what they see as a total war against their apostate adversaries. Moreover, their terrorist acts are executed for their own audience and constituency, not to coerce their government adversaries to negotiate over their objectives. Thus, the restraints that may exist on preventing resorting to CBRN violence by secular terrorists who still believe in coexisting with their political adversaries, although in a different type of political system, are not necessarily relevant to religious terrorists.

Conclusion

How likely might terrorist groups or lone actors plan and prepare to launch a major CBRN attack? As discussed in the six variables, they would have to attain proficiency in developing, manufacturing, and deploying such sophisticated weapons, but terrorists’ lack of professional expertise in the myriad technological tasks involved in CBRN use would make them li­able to make mistakes and vulnerable to detection.

In the technical realm, moreover, untrained operatives may have difficulty integrating biological agents with munitions or dis­seminating agents against open-air targets. They may experience numerous testing failures, their fa­cilities may catch fire, or there might be accidental leaks in their facilities. In terms of the personnel working on such projects, counterterrorism services might succeed in influencing some of their operatives to become informers, leading to exposure of a group’s CBRN pro­gram. Moreover, a group’s attempts to recruit for­eign technical warfare specialists may fail or may be reported to the targeted authorities. As a result of the clandestine nature of their operations and constant surveillance of their activities by government security forces and the pressure of operating underground, their group might be overcome by internal paranoia, causing them to embark on hasty actions and make mistakes.

As a result of these factors, since the terrorists’ primary objective is to cause as much immediate death, shock, and fear as possible, the bar to accessing CBRN weapons remains very high, which is one of the reasons they have rarely employed them. They prefer to employ simpler weapons and tactics such as mass shootings, vehicular ramming, suicide bombings with IEDs, and aircraft hijackings, etc. Thus, killing 100 people in a shopping mall with a semi-automatic rifle is easier for terrorists than killing a comparable number of victims with a chemical weapon or RDD – although Aum Shinrikyo’s 1995 sarin gas attack in the Tokyo subway system might still present a template for such a future attack.

As demonstrated by the COVID-19 pandemic, nevertheless, what are considered rare and unlikely CBRN events, might still occur. For example, emergent technologies such as the application of artificial intelligence in bioengineering to create highly lethal viral variants, nuclear microreactors, drone technology to disperse radioactive substances, and 3D printing, as well as the provision of such weapons by rogue state sponsors, represent game changers in CBRN terrorist warfare. In response, governments’ counterterrorism services need to be continuously vigilant in anticipating such worst-case scenarios, preempting and preventing them at the earliest possible pre-incident phases.

Dr. Joshua Sinai is Professor of Practice, Intelligence & Global Security Studies, at Capitol Technology University, in Laurel, MD. He specializes in developing methodologies to forecast the likelihood of terrorist groups conducting CBRN warfare. At his university, he developed and teaches an undergraduate course on terrorism and CBRN.

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